Cuba and the U.S.: Che Guevara’s interview to Monthly Review

The questions below were submitted, in writing, to Comandante Guevara by Leo Huberman during the week of the Bay of Pigs invasion; the answers were received the end of June 1961.

1. Have relations with the U.S. gone “over the brink” or is it still possible to work out a modus vivendi?

This question has two answers: one, which we might term “philosophical,” and the other, “political.” The philosophical answer is that the aggressive state of North American monopoly capitalism and the accelerated transition toward fascism make any kind of agreement impossible; and relations will necessarily remain tense or even worse until the final destruction of imperialism. The other, political answer, asserts that these relations are not our fault, and that, as we have many times demonstrated, the most recent time being after the defeat of the Giron Beach landing, we are ready for any kind of agreement on terms of equality with the Government of the United States.

2. The U.S. holds Cuba responsible for the rupture in relations while Cuba blames the U.S. What part of the blame, in your opinion, can be correctly attributed to your country? In short, what mistakes have you made in your dealings with the U.S.?

Very few, we believe; perhaps some in matters of form. But we hold the firm conviction that we have acted for our part in accord with the right, and that we have responded to the interests of the people in each of our acts. The trouble is that our interests, that is, those of the people, and the interests of the North American monopolies are at variance.

3. Assuming that the U.S. means to smash the Cuban Revolution, what are the chances of its getting help from the O.A.S. group?

Everything depends on what is meant by “smash.” If this means the violent destruction of the revolutionary regime with the help—likewise direct—of the O.A.S., I believe there is very little possibility, because history cannot be ignored. The countries of America understand the value of active solidarity among friendly countries, and they would not risk a reversal of such magnitude.

4. Does Cuba align itself in international affairs with the neutralist or Soviet bloc?

Cuba will align herself with justice; or, to be less absolute, with what she takes for justice. We do not practice politics by blocs, so that we cannot side with the neutralist bloc, nor, for the same reason, do we belong to the socialist bloc. But wherever there is a question of defending a just cause, there we will cast our votes—even on the side of the United States if that country should ever assume the role of defending just causes.

5. What is Cuba’s chief domestic problem?

It is difficult to assess problems with such precision. I can mention several: the “guerrillerismo” which still exists in the government; the lack of comprehension on the part of some sectors of the people of the necessity for sacrifice; the lack of some raw materials for industries and some non-durable consumer goods, resulting in certain scarcities; the uncertainty as to when the next imperialist attack will take place; the upsets in production caused by mobilization. These are some of the problems which trouble us at times, but, far from distressing us, they serve to accustom us to the struggle.

6. How do you explain the growing number of Cuban counter-revolutionaries and the defection of so many former revolutionaries?

Revolutions function by waves. When Mr. Huberman asked this question, perhaps it was accurate, but today there are fewer counter-revolutionaries than before Giron Beach. The counter-revolutionary attack increased slowly until it reached its climax on Giron Beach; then it was defeated and fell drastically to zero. Now that it is again attempting to raise its head and inflict new harm, our intention is to eliminate the counter-revolutionaries.

The defections of more or less prominent figures are due to the fact that the socialist revolution left the opportunists, the ambitious, and the fearful far behind and now advances toward a new regime free of this class of vermin.

7. Can the countries of Latin America solve their problems while maintaining the capitalist system, or must they take the path of socialism as Cuba has done?

It seems elementary to us that the way of the socialist revolution must be chosen, the exploitation of man by man must be abolished, economic planning must be undertaken, and all means of assisting the public welfare must be placed at the service of the community.

8. Are civil liberties, Western style, permanently finished while your government is in power?

This would depend on what civil rights were referred to—the civil right, for example, of the white to make the Negro sit in the rear of a bus; the right of the white to keep the Negro off a beach or bar him from a certain zone; the right of the Ku Klux Klan to assassinate any Negro who looks at a white woman; the right of a Faubus, in a word, or perhaps the right of a Trujillo, or Somoza, or Stroessner, or Duvalier. In any case, it would be necessary to define the term more precisely, to see if it also includes the right to welcome punitive expeditions sent by a country to the north.

9. What kind of political system do you envisage for Cuba after the present emergency period of reorganization and reconstruction is over?

In general terms it may be said that a political power which is attentive to the needs of the majority of the people must be in constant communication with the people and must know how to express what the people, with their many mouths, only hint at. How to achieve this is a practical task which will take us some time. In any event, the present revolutionary period must still persist for some time, and it is not possible to talk of structural reorganization while the threat of war still haunts our island.

Monthly Review, 1961, Volume 13, Issue 05 (September) / Cuba and the U.S.

Read the Greek version.

Ραούλ Κάστρο (Raúl Castro)

Ο Ραούλ Μοδέστο Κάστρο Ρούζ, όπως είναι το πλήρες όνομα του, είναι ο μικρότερος αδελφός του Φιντέλ και Πρόεδρος της Κούβας από το 2008. Γεννημένος το 1931 στο Μπιράν της Κούβας, η ζωή και η δράση του βρέθηκε πάντα στη σκιά του θρυλικού αδελφού του. Ο Ραούλ υπήρξε ο λόγος της συνάντησης του Φιντέλ με τον Τσε Γκεβάρα στο Μεξικό, καθώς ήταν πρωτοβουλία του ιδίου να συστήσει τον νεαρό τότε αργεντίνο γιατρό στον αδελφό του. Καθόλη τη διάρκεια της επαναστατικής δραστηριότητας στην Κούβα ο Ραούλ υπήρξε σταθερά αρωγός και υποστηρικτής των προσπαθειών του Φιντέλ, κάτι που συνεχίστηκε μέχρι τη μεταβίβαση των εξουσιών στον ίδιο το 2008.

Μετά την επιτυχή έκβαση της επανάστασης το 1959, ο Ραούλ διορίστηκε αρχηγός των κουβανικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Το 1962 διορίστηκε αναπληρωτής πρωθυπουργός ενώ αργότερα έγινε ο πρώτος αντιπρόεδρος του Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου του κράτους. Θεωρείται ο υπουργός ενόπλων δυνάμεων (Άμυνας) με τη μακροβιότερη θητεία παγκοσμίως. Το 2006 ο Φιντέλ, λόγω εξασθενημένης υγείας, μεταβίβασε τις κυβερνητικές εξουσίες στο Ραούλ, κάτι που επισημοποιήθηκε το 2008 με την παραίτηση του ιστορικού ηγέτη από τη θέση του προέδρου.

Ο Ραούλ είναι παντρεμένος εδώ και 45 χρόνια με την Βίλμα Εσπίν και έχουν τρείς κόρες και ένα γιό.

Φουλχένσιο Μπατίστα (Fulgencio Batista)

Ο Φουλχένσιο Μπατίστα (1901-1973) υπήρξε Κουβανός στρατηγός, Πρόεδρος και δικτάτορας έχοντας την υποστήριξη των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών της Αμερικής. Υπήρξε ηγέτης της Κούβας κατά τα διαστήματα 1933-1944 και 1952-1959. Το 1959 ανατράπηκε ως αποτέλεσμα της επικράτησης της Κουβανικής Επανάστασης. Η δικτατορία του αποτέλεσε την αφορμή γιά τον Τσε  ώστε να μεταβεί στην Κούβα προς υποστήριξη του επαναστατικού κινήματος.

Ο Μπατίστα προέρχονταν από φτωχή οικογένεια, μικτής αφρικανικής-ευρωπαϊκής και κινεζικής καταγωγής. Ως νεαρός απασχολήθηκε σε διάφορες εργασίες (ράπτης, λιμενεργάτης, στους σιδηροδρόμους) ώσπου τελικά κατατάχθηκε στον στρατό. Το 1933, ως λοχίας έχοντας ήδη μεγάλη επιρροή σε μερίδα στρατιωτών, συμμετείχε στην λεγόμενη «επανάσταση των λοχιών», μια πραξικοπηματική ενέργεια, που σε συνεργασία με τον Αμερικανό πρέσβη της Κούβας, συντέλεσε στην κατάλυση του πολιτεύματος της χώρας. Τελικά νέος πρόεδρος ανακηρύχθηκε ο Ραμόν Γκραού Σαν Μαρτίν και αρχηγός του στρατεύματος ο ίδιος ο Μπατίστα που προήχθη σε συνταγματάρχη. Στην πραγματικότητα όμως ο πραγματικός ηγέτης της χώρας ήταν ο Μπατίστα, ενώ μια σειρά από προέδρους που ακολούθησαν τα επόμενα χρόνια δεν είχαν ουσιαστικές αρμοδιότητες.

Κατέβηκε ως υποψήφιος στις εκλογές του 1940 και αναδείχθηκε νικητής. Διετέλεσε έτσι και ονομαστικός ηγέτης για την επόμενη τετραετία ως επικεφαλής ενός συνασπισμού κομμάτων. Αν και ο Μπατίστα ήταν καπιταλιστής και σταθερός θαυμαστής της πολιτικής των Η.Π.Α., υποστηρίχθηκε επίσης και από το Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κούβας, που εκείνη την εποχή είχε μικρή απήχηση στη χώρα. Αυτή η υποστήριξη οφειλόταν κυρίως στους νόμους που ενίσχυαν τα εργατικά σωματεία.

Στις εκλογές του 1944 ο Μπατίστα ηττήθηκε από τον Γκραού και έφυγε για τις Η.Π.Α. όπου και έζησε τα επόμενα έτη. Το 1952 αποφάσισε να κατέβει και πάλι υποψήφιος για τις κουβανικές εκλογές, όμως το κόμμα του πήρε την τρίτη θέση στην αναμέτρηση. Στις 10 Μαρτίου 1952, 3 μήνες μετά τις τελευταίες εκλογές, ο Μπατίστα με την υποστήριξη του στρατού κατέλυσε το πολίτευμα, θεωρώντας τις εκλογές άκυρες και ανακηρύχθηκε ο ίδιος «προσωρινός πρόεδρος». Επί της ουσίας εγκαθύδρισε στο νησί μιά στιγνή στρατοκρατική δικτατορία. Αμέσως μετά οι Η.Π.Α. αναγνώρισαν το καθεστώς.

Η δεύτερη περίοδος της ηγεσίας Μπατίστα δεν είχε στοιχεία προόδου, αλλά υπήρξε έντονη η επιθυμία του να αποκτήσει την εύνοια των εύπορων κοινωνικών στρωμάτων. Στην Αβάνα ο τζόγος ανθούσε, ενώ εικάζεται ότι έγιναν και οικονομικές συμφωνίες μεταξύ του και Αμερικανών-προσωπικοτήτων του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος (μαφία).

Μέχρι την άνοιξη του 1958 οι Η.Π.Α. ενίσχυαν το καθεστώς Μπατίστα με οπλισμό τελευταίας τεχνολογίας προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσει πιθανή επαναστατική κίνηση. Τον Μάρτιο, όμως, του ίδιου έτους μετά από σοβαρές συμπλοκές με αντικαθεστωτικούς κύκλους ο Αμερικανός πρόεδρος Ντουάιτ Αϊζενχάουερ συνέστησε στον Μπατίστα να προκηρύξει εκλογές. Οι εκλογές πραγματοποιήθηκαν, όμως η αποχή ήταν σχεδόν καθολική, που έφτανε το 98% στο Σαντιάγο ντε Κούβα. Την 1η Ιανουαρίου 1959, καθώς οι επαναστατικές δυνάμεις του Φιντέλ Κάστρο προήλαυναν, μετά τη νίκη τους στην Σάντα Κλάρα, προς την Αβάνα, ο Μπατίστα διέφυγε αεροπορικώς από τη χώρα. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και το Μεξικό δεν έκαναν δεκτή την αίτηση του γιά άσυλο κι’ έτσι βρέθηκε στην Πορτογαλία, της οποία ο τότε πρόεδρος Αντόνιο Σαλαζάρ δέχτηκε να τον φιλοξενήσει με την προϋπόθεση ότι θα απείχε πλήρως από την πολιτική.

Ο αμερικανός πρόεδρος Τζον Φ. Κέννεντι – του οποίου η χώρα παραδοσιακά ανέδειξε, στήριξε και ενίσχυσε καθεστώτα τύπου Μπατίστα – χαρακτήρισε τη δικτατορία του Μπατίστα ως «μία από τις πλέον αιματοβαμμένες και καταπιεστικές στη μακρά ιστορία της καταπίεσης στη Λατινική Αμερική».

Πέθανε το 1973 από ανακοπή καρδιάς στη Γκουανταλμίνα, κοντά στη Μαρμπέλα της Ισπανίας.

(Το άρθρο βασίστηκε στο Παγκόσμιο Βιογραφικό Λεξικό της Εκδοτικής Αθηνών, 1987).

Che’s ideas are absolutely relevant today: A speech by Fidel Castro

The following speech was given by Fidel Castro on 8 October 1987 at the main ceremony marking the twentieth anniversary of Guevara’s death. It was held at a newly completed electronics components factory in the city of Pinar del Río.

Nearly twenty years ago, on October 18, 1967, we met in the Plaza of the Revolution with a huge crown to honor Compañero Ernesto Che Guevara, Those were very bitter, very difficult days as when we received news of the developments in Vado del Yeso, in the Yuro Ravine, when news agencies reported Che had fallen in battle.

It didn’t take long to realize that those reports were absolutely correct, for they consisted of news items and photos that proved it beyond doubt. For several days, the news was coming until with all that information in hand — although many of the details we know today were not known at the time — we held the large mass rally, the solemn ceremony in which we paid our last respects to fallen compañero.

Nearly twenty years have passed since then, and now, on October 8, we are marking the date he fell in battle. According to reliable reports we have now, he was actually murdered the following day after having been captured unarmed and wounded; his weapon had been rendered useless in battle. That’s why it has become a tradition to commemorate that dramatic event on October 8. The first year passed and then five, ten, fifteen, now twenty years, and it was necessary to recall the historic dimensions of that development, and particularly the man. Thus in a natural way, rather than a very deliberate or pondered way, the entire people have been recalling the date in recent months. It was possible to commemorate the twentieth anniversary on a solemn note as we have seen here today: The playing of taps, the anthem, the magnificent poem by Nicolás Guillén, which rang out with the same voice we heard twenty years ago.

I could try to give a very solemn, grandiloquent speech, perhaps a written speech, but in these times the pressure of work barely leaves a minute free for thinking more carefully about all those events and the things I could say here, let alone for writing a speech — that’s why I’d prefer to recall Che, share my thoughts with you, because I’ve thought a lot about Che. I did an interview, part of which was made public yesterday in our country, in answer to the questions of an Italian journalist who had me in front of the television cameras nearly sixteen hours straight — actually, they were movie, not TV cameras, because in order to get a better image in everything he did, he didn’t use videocassettes, some of which last two hours, but rather movie cameras. He’d change reels every twenty or twenty-five minutes, and so it was quite an exhausting interview. We should have taken three days to do to do it, but we had to do it in one because there was no more time. We started before noon on a Sunday and finished at 5:00 a.m. the following day. There were more that 100 questions. Among the variety of subjects and themes, the journalist was very interested in talking about Che, and between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. we got to the subject. I made an effort to answer each of his questions, and I made a special effort to summarize my memories of Che.

I told him how I felt, and I think many compañeros feel the same way, regarding Che’s permanent presence. We must keep in the special relationship with Che, the affection, the fraternal bonds of comradeship, the united struggle over nearly twelve years, from the moment we met in Mexico until the end, a period rich in historic events, some of which have been made public only in the last couple of days.

It was a period filled with heroic and glorious deeds, from the time Che joined us to go on the Granma expedition, the landing, the setbacks, the most difficult days, the resumption of the struggle in the mountains, rebuilding an army virtually from scratch, the first clashes, and the last battles. Then the intense period that followed, one after another, such as the start of imperialist hostility; the blockade; the slander campaigns against the revolution as soon as we started to do justice to the criminals and thugs who had murdered thousands of our fellow citizens; the economic blockade; the Girón [Bay of Pigs] invasion; the proclamation of the socialist nature of the revolution; the struggle against the mercenaries; the October [missile] crisis; the first steps in the construction of socialism when there was nothing — neither experience nor cadres nor engineers nor economists and hardly any technicians, when we were left almost without doctors because 3,000 of the 6,000 doctors in the country left.

Then came the First and Second Declarations of Havana, the start of the isolation imposed on our country, the collective rupture of diplomatic relations by all Latin American governments except Mexico. It was a period in which, along with all these developments, we had to organize the economy of the country. It was a relatively brief but fruitful period replete with unforgettable events.

It must be kept in mind that Che persisted in an old desire, an old idea: to return to South America, to his country, to make the revolution based on the experience he’d gained in our country. We should recall the clandestine way in which his departure had to be organized, the barrage of slanders against the revolution when there was talk of conflicts, of differences with Che, that Che had disappeared. It was even said the he had been murdered because of splits in the ranks of the revolution.

Meanwhile, the revolution calmly and firmly endured the ferocious attack, because over and above the irritation and the bitterness caused by those campaigns, the important thing was for Che to be able to fulfill his goals; the important thing was to ensure his safety and that of the compatriots with him on his historic missions.
In the interview I explained the origin of that idea, how when he joined us he had set only one condition: that once the revolution was made, when he wanted to return to South America he would not be prevented from doing so for reason of state or for the state’s convenience, that he would not be held back. We told him he could go ahead and that we would support him. He would remind us of this pledge every so often until the time came he decided it was time to leave.

Not only did we keep the promise of agreeing to his departure, but we gave him all the help we could. We tried to delay the departure a little. We gave him other tasks to enrich his guerrilla experience, and we tried to create a minimum of conditions so that he would not have go through the most difficult stage of the first days of organizing a guerrilla force, something we knew full well from our own experience.
We were well aware of Che’s talent, his experience and his role. He was a cadre suited to major strategic tasks and we felt it might be better if other compañeros undertook the initial organizational work and that he join at a more advanced stage in the process. This also fit in with our policy during the war of saving cadres, as they distinguished themselves, for increasingly important and strategic assignments. We did not have many experienced cadres, and as they distinguished themselves we would not send them out every day with a squad to ambush; rather, we gave them more important tasks in keeping with their ability and experience.

Read Part Two.

Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κούβας (PCC)

Το Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα της Κούβας (Partido Communista de Cuba) αποτελεί τη μετεξέλιξη της Επαναστατικής κυβέρνησης του Φιντέλ Κάστρο που ανέλαβε την εξουσία το 1959. Βασισμένο αρχές του μαρξισμού-λενινισμού, ιδρύθηκε στις 3 Οκτωβρίου 1965 στην Αβάνα. Πρώτος Γενικός Γραμματέας ορίστηκε τότε ο σημερινός πρόεδρος της χώρας, Ραούλ Κάστρο.

Το πρώτο συνέδριο του Κόμματος έλαβε χώρα το 1975 ενώ ακολούθησαν συνέδρια το 1980, το 1986 το 1991 και το 1997. Το πιό πρόσφατο Συνέδριο (6ο) έλαβε χώρα τον Απρίλιο του 2011 στην Αβάνα.

Το επίσημο δημοσιογραφικό όργανο του κόμματος είναι η εφημερίδα «Γκράνμα» (Granma).

Λα Καμπάνια (La Cabaña)

Το Οχυρό του Σαν Κάρλος δε λα Καμπάνια (Fortaleza de San Carlos de la Cabaña), γνωστό ως Λα Καμπάνια, είναι ένα σύμπλεγμα κάστρων του 18ου αιώνα και βρίσκεται στην ανατολική πλευρά του λιμανιού της Αβάνας. Θεωρείται το μεγαλύτερο σε όλην την αμερικανική ήπειρο.

Το κάστρο της Λα Καμπάνια χρησίμευσε ως στρατιωτική βάση και φυλακή τόσο κατά την ισπανική αποικιοκρατία όσο και κατά την διάρκεια της κουβανικής ανεξαρτησίας. Υπήρξε στρατιωτική φυλακή γιά αντιφρονούντες κατά τη δικτατορία του Φουλχένσιο Μπατίστα έως και τον Ιανουάριο  του 1959 όταν και καταλήφθηκε από δυνάμεις των ανταρτών υπό την ηγεσία του Τσε Γκεβάρα. Γιά διάστημε πέντε μηνών αποτέλεσε τη βάση του Τσε ο οποίος επέβλεπε τη δικαστική διαδικασία γιά απόδοση δικαιοσύνης γιά λογαριασμό της νέας επαναστατικής κυβέρνησης. Στη Λα Καμπάνια δικάστηκαν – και ορισμένοι εξ’ αυτών εκτελέστηκαν – συμμετέχοντες στο καθεστώς Μπατίστα και συνεργαζόμενοι με τη δικτατορία.

Σήμερα, οι περιβόητες φυλακές της Λα Καμπάνια αποτελούν μουσείο προσβάσιμο στο κοινό, ενώ σώζεται το γραφείο απ’ όπου ο Ερνέστο Γκεβάρα ασκούσε τη διοίκηση των δυνάμεων του οχυρού κατά την Κρίση των Πυραύλων το 1961. Κρατώντας ένα έθιμο που υπάρχει από την περίοδο της αποικιοκρατίας, κάθε βράδυ στις 9:00 ακούγεται κανονιοβολισμός (γνωστό ως «το κανόνι των 9») που συμβολίζει το κλείσιμο των τειχών της πρωτεύουσας.

Che’s ideas are absolutely relevant today: A speech by Fidel Castro (Part Two)

Thus, I remember that during the days of Batista’s final offensive in the Sierra Maestra mountains against our militant but small forces, the most experienced cadres were not in the front lines; they were assigned strategic leadership assignments and save for our devastating counterattack. It would have been pointless to put Che, Camilo [Cienfuegos], and other compañeros who had participated in many battles at the head of a squad. We held them back so that they could subsequently lead columns that would undertake risky missions of great importance, it was then that we did send them in enemy territory with full responsibility and awareness of the risks as in the case of the invasion of Las Villas led by Camilo and Che, an extraordinarily difficult assignment that required men of great experience and authority as column commanders, men capable of reaching the goal.

In line with this reasoning, and considering the objectives, perhaps it would have been better if this principle had been observed and Che had joined at a later stage. It really was no so critical for him to handle everything right from the start. But he was impatient, very impatient really. Some Argentine comrades had been killed in the initial efforts he had made years before, including Ricardo Massetti, the founder of Presna Latina. He remembered that often and was really impatient to start to participate personally in the work.

As always, we respected our commitments and his views, for our relationship was always based on absolute trust, absolute brotherhood, regardless of our ideas about what would be the right time for him to join in. And so we gave him all the help and the facilities possible to start the struggle. The news came of the first clashes, and contact was completely lost. The enemy detected the initial stage of organization of the guerrilla movement, and that marked the start of a period lasting many months in which almost the only news we received was what came via international news dispatches, and we had to know how to interpret them. But that’s something our revolution had become very experienced at: determining when a report is reliable or when it is made up, false.

I remember, for example, when a dispatch came with the news of the death of Joaquín’s grip (his real name was Vilo Acuña.* When we analyzed it, I immediately concluded that it was true, this was because of the way they described how the group had been eliminated while crossing a river. Because of our own guerrilla experience, because of what we had lived through, we knew how a small guerrilla group can be done away with. We knew the few, exceptional ways such a group can be destroyed,

When it was reported that a peasant had made contact with the army and provided detailed information on the location and plans of the group, which was looking for a way to cross the river; how the army set up an ambush on the other bank at a spot on the route the same peasant had told the guerrilla fighters to use; the way the army opened fire in midstream; there was no doubt as to the truth of the explanation. If the writers of false reports, which came in often, tried to do it again, it was impossible to admit that they, who were always so clumsy in their lies, would have had enough intelligence and experience to make up the exact and only circumstances in which the group could be eliminated. That’s why we conclude the report was true. Long years of revolutionary experience had taught us to decipher dispatches and tell the difference between the truth and the falsehood of each development; although, of course, there are other things to keep in mind when making a judgment. But that was the type of information we had about the situation until the news of Che’s death arrived.

As we have explained, we had hopes that even with only twenty men left, even in a very difficult situation, the guerrillas still had a chance. They were headed toward an area where sectors of the peasants were organized, where some good Bolivian cadres had influence, and until that moment, until almost the very end, there was chance that the movement could consolidate and could develop. But the circumstances in which my relationship with Che were so unique — the almost unreal history of the brief but intense saga of the first year of the revolution when we were used to making the impossible possible — that is, as I explained to that journalist, one had the permanent impression that Che had not died, that he was still alive. Sine his was such an exemplary personality, so unforgettable, so familiar, it was difficult to resign oneself to the idea of his death.

Sometimes I would dream — all of us dream of things related to our lives and struggles — that I saw Che, that he returned, that we was alive. How often this happened! I told the journalist that these are feelings you seldom talk about, but they give an idea of the impact of Che’s personality and also of the extraordinary degree to which he really lives on, almost as if his was a physical presence, with his ideas and deeds, with his example and all the things he created, with his continued relevance and the respect for him not only in Latin America but in Europe and all over the world. As we predicted on October 18, twenty years ago, he became a symbol for all the oppressed, for all the exploited, for all the patriotic and democratic forces, for all the revolutionaries. He became a permanent and invincible symbol.

We feel Che’s presence for all these reasons, because of the real force that he still has today which, even though twenty years have gone by, exists in the spirit of all of us, when we hear the poem, when we hear the anthem, or the bugle is sounded before a moment’s silence, when we open our newspapers and see photographs of Che during different stages of his life, his image, so well known throughout the world — because it has to be said that Che not only had the virtues and all the human moral qualities to be a symbol, he also had the appearance of a symbol, the image of a symbol: his look, the frankness and strength of his look; his face, which reflects character irrepressibly determined for action, at the same time showing great intelligence and great purity — when we look at the poems that have been written, the episodes that are recounted, and the stories that are repeated, we feel the reality of Che’s relevance, of his presence.

It’s not strange if one feels Che’s presence not only in everyday life, but even in dreams if one imagines that he is alive, that Che is in action and that he never died. In the end we must reach the conclusion that for all intents and purposes in the life of our revolution, Che never died, and the light that of what has been done, he is more alive than ever, has more influence than ever, and is a more powerful opponent of imperialism than ever. Those who disposed of his body so that he would not become a symbol; those who, under the guidance of the methods of their imperial masters, did not want any trace to remain, have discovered that although his tomb is unmarked, there are no remains, and there is no body, nevertheless a frightening opponent of imperialism, a symbol, a force, a presence that can never be destroyed, does exist.

When they hid Che’s body, they showed their weakness and their cowardice, because they also showed their fear of the example and the symbol. They did not want the exploited peasants, the workers, the students, the intellectuals, the democrats, the progressives or the patriots of this hemisphere to have a place to go to pay tribute to Che’s remains. And in the world today, in which there is no specific place to go to pay tribute to Che’s remains, tribute is paid to everywhere.

Today tribute is not paid to Che once a year, not once ever five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years; today homage is paid to Che every year every month, every day, everywhere, in a factory, in a school, in a military barracks, in a home, among children, among Pioneers. Who can count how many millions of times in these twenty years, the Pioneers have said: “Pioneers for communism, we will be like Che”!

Really, there can be no superior symbol, there can be no better image, when searching for a model revolutionary man, when searching for the model communist. I say this because I have the deepest conviction — I always have had and I still have today, just the same or more so when I spoke that October 18 and I asked how we wanted our fighters, our revolutionaries, our party members, our children to be, and I said we wanted them to be like Che. Because Che is the personification, Che is the image of that new man, the image of that human being if we want to talk about a communist society; if our real objective is to build, not just socialism but the higher stages of socialism, if humanity is not going to renounce the lofty and extraordinary idea of living in a communist society one day.

If we need a paradigm, a model, an example to follow, then men like Che are essential, as are men and women who imitate him, who are like him, who think like, who act like him; men and women whose conduct resembles his when it comes to doing their duty, in every little thing, every detail, every activity; in his attitude toward work, his habit of teaching and educating by setting an example; his attitude of wanting to be first at everything, the first to volunteer for the most difficult tasks, the hardest ones, the most self-sacrificing ones; the individual who gives his body and soul to others, the person who displays true solidarity, the individual who never lets down a compañero; the simple man; the man without a flaw, who doesn’t live any contradiction between what he says and what he does, between what he practices and what he preaches; a man of thought and a man of action — all of which Che symbolizes.

For our country, it is a great honor and privilege to have had Che as a son of our people even though he wasn’t born in this land. He was a son because he earned the right consider himself and to be considered a son of our country, and it is an honor and a privilege for our people, for our country, for our country’s history, for our revolution to have had among its ranks a truly exceptional man such as Che.
That’s not to say that exceptional people are rare; that’s not to say that amid the masses there are not hundreds, thousands, even millions of exceptional men and women. I said it once during the bitter days after Camilo disappeared. When I recounted the history of how Camilo became the man he was, I said: “Among our people there are many Camilos.” I could say: “Among our peoples, among the peoples of Latin America and peoples of the world, there are many Ches.” But, why do we call them exceptional? Because in actual fact, in the world in which they lived, in the circumstances in which they lived, they had the chance and the opportunity to demonstrate all that man, with his generosity and solidarity, is capable of being. And, indeed, seldom do ideal circumstances exist in which man has the opportunity to express himself and to show everything he has inside as was the case with Che.
Of course, it’s clear that there are countless men and women among the masses who, partly as a result of other people’s examples and certain new values, are capable of heroism, including a kind of heroism I greatly admire: silent heroism, anonymous heroism, silent virtue, anonymous virtue, But given that its so unusual, so rare for all the necessary circumstances to exist to produce a figure like Che — who today has become a symbol for world, a symbol that will grow — it is a great honor and privilege that this figure was born during our revolution.
And as proof of what I said earlier about Che’s presence and force today, I could ask: Is there a better date, a better anniversary than this one to remember Che with all our conviction and deep feelings of appreciation and gratitude? Is there a better moment than this particular anniversary, when we are in the middle of the rectification process?

What are we rectifying? We are rectifying all those things — and there are many — that strayed from the revolutionary spirit, from revolutionary work, revolutionary virtue, revolutionary effort, revolutionary responsibility; all those things that strayed from the spirit of solidarity among people. We’re rectifying all the shoddiness and mediocrity that is precisely the negation of Che’s ideas, his revolutionary thought, his style, his spirit and his example. I really believe, and I say it with great satisfaction, that if Che were sitting in this chair, he would feel jubilant. He would be happy about what we are doing these days, just like he would have felt very unhappy during that unstable period, that disgraceful period of building socialism in which there began to prevail a series of ideas, of mechanisms, of bad habits, which would have caused Che to feel profound and terrible bitterness.